The Report : Nominating Process

Nominating Process (download pdf version)

Election 2000 illuminated certain deficiencies within our electoral system, but more importantly, it has presented a challenge to improve public satisfaction with the ways in which our nation chooses a chief executive. The process as a whole, from start to finish, has failed to engage the citizenry. In the effort to build confidence in our institutions, one must clearly look at more than just Election Day.

2008 UPDATE: Read more about the "Regional Lottery Plan" in an excerpt from Larry Sabato's new book, A More Perfect Consitution (Walker & Co.).

A significant portion of the discussion and research associated with the 2000 National Symposium on Presidential Selection was devoted to the presidential nominating calendar. This focus reflects the Center's belief that the process by which parties pick their nominees can offer an ideal opportunity to attract more citizens to the political process. However, judging from recent voter turnout, state primaries and caucuses have not been successful in mobilizing the public. Just 17.7 percent of eligible voters turned out during the primary season in 2000-an improvement over the 16.9 percent who participated in 1996, but still the second lowest percentage since 1960.¹

The Center's inquiry regarding the nominating process focuses on the issue vis-à-vis its impact on citizen involvement. There are, of course, other factors involved in the scheduling of nominating contests. The states seek to maximize their exposure while minimizing costs. And the parties aspire to best position their nominee in the general election, while not making their selection process susceptible to hijack by forces outside the party base. Through this report, however, the Center seeks to encourage the parties and states to address the broader concern of bringing more citizens into the political fold. The Center believes that the health of the electoral process certainly benefits from any movement in this direction, and the parties and the states may stand to benefit in the long run as well.

By examining the issues surrounding the nominating calendar and discussing a few of the most notable reform proposals, we hope to broaden the discourse on this critical institution.

ISSUES SURROUNDING THE CURRENT SYSTEM

1. New Hampshire and Iowa

New Hampshire and Iowa have established themselves as the permanent "poll position" occupants in the nation's presidential nominating season. Because of their "first-in-the-nation" status, these two small states consistently dominate media and candidate attention, thus giving them the power to make or break campaigns. The momentum from a win in one of these states, or more importantly, a symbolic victory as declared by the press, can help propel a candidate to the front of the horserace.

In a memorandum submitted to Republican National Committee members and delegates on the subject of the GOP's presidential primary calendar, Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) offered several key arguments in favor of keeping Iowa and New Hampshire's lock on the first contests of the nominating season. Smith reasons that there is something to be said for holding these first events in the same place every four years. For starters, he points out that reporters have valuable experience covering Iowa and New Hampshire. "They understand the processes and they are ready for them," says Smith. "They are fully prepared to cover televised debates, and they normally have substantial on-the-ground coverage to ensure that the local activities are televised on a national scale."²

Smith also contends that the residents of Iowa and New Hampshire have grown accustomed to serving as an initial filter in presidential politics. USA Today's Jill Lawrence, who has covered the four presidential elections since 1988, agreed with this point. "They are very committed to their gate-keeping roles and they have a lot of traditions and customs and very conscientious people who really, really know how to do this by now," Lawrence noted at the Center's Symposium. "They do take their politics very seriously in New Hampshire."³

"Iowa and New Hampshire are actually pretty good places to go," said former GOP presidential candidate and Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander at a Center event. "You have to go somewhere to start, otherwise everyone who starts in a regional primary would have to be either rich or famous." He likened these two leadoff contests to "off-Broadway venues" in that they allow candidates to audition and build grassroots support. Alexander explains: "We have off-Broadway plays and if the plays are good, they go to New York. The problem is, nobody ever gets to New York in the system we've got."⁴

There are certainly benefits to kicking off the nominating process with two relatively small states, such as Iowa and New Hampshire. But there is also cause to question the wisdom of this arrangement cycle after cycle. No matter how well Iowa and New Hampshire perform their current presidential selection duties, many wonder why these states, and the issues facing their citizens, should receive the inordinate amount of attention they presently enjoy.

Michael Dukakis

"I spent 85 campaign days in the state of Iowa alone [in the 1988 presidential campaign]," recalled Michael Dukakis, former Democratic presidential nominee and Massachusetts Governor, at the Symposium. "Now, Iowa is a great state and I mean that. And they did very well by Mike Dukakis. But, 85 full campaign days in one state, folks, really doesn't make a hell of a lot of sense, does it?"⁵

The extraordinary attention paid to these states is further called into question when one considers their demographic composition. "They are too homogeneous," noted Craig Smith, campaign manager for Gore 2000, at the Symposium. "They don't accurately represent the American populace."⁶ Indeed, the percentage of African Americans in Iowa and New Hampshire, 2.1 and 0.7, respectively, falls short of the national average (12.3 percent). The percentage of persons below poverty also falls significantly short of the national average.⁷

2. Frontloading

Perhaps most troubling, the mystique surrounding Iowa and New Hampshire has played a role in prompting the other 48 states to follow suit. The phenomenon of front-loading, or states pushing their primary dates forward to gain national attention, poses a major challenge to the nominating calendar.

As states are left to set their own primary schedule, those states which traditionally fell towards the end of the primary schedule have pushed their dates earlier, while those states traditionally at the beginning of the calendar have pushed further forward to maintain their "first" status. Front-loading has become the proverbial dog chasing its own tail. As those at the end draw nearer to the beginning, those at the beginning will seek to further distance themselves from those drawing near.

Many states push their nominating contest further up in the calendar with the hope of increasing the role their citizens play in the process. Ironically, the aggregate effect of this impulse may achieve quite the opposite. With contests bunched together in a short period of time, candidates may actually be less able to spend a great deal of time interacting with voters. "In an effort to make their states more important, they've actually reduced the opportunities for candidates to campaign there or do any retail politicking," observed former New Hampshire GOP Chairman Steve Duprey in a July 1999 Washington Post article.⁸

Front-loading also impacts the quantity and quality of media coverage. Kathleen E. Kendall comments on the media's coverage of the 1996 primaries in her paper "Communication Patterns in Presidential Primaries 1912-2000: Knowing the Rules of the Game." She writes: "On March 9, only 18 days after the New Hampshire primary, the networks began to speak as though the primary contest was over. Media coverage dropped off precipitously from March on, true to the pattern found in primaries through history: no contest-no coverage."⁹

Front-loading also makes it less likely that media outlets will focus on issue coverage as opposed to horserace reporting-calling "winners" and "losers" one contest after another. "We don't want to write about anything other than the horserace," stated Vaughn Ververs of The Hotline. "We don't want to talk about issues because … that doesn't sell newspapers. It doesn't sell magazines. It doesn't get TV ratings."¹⁰

Furthermore, a front-loaded primary schedule works to the advantage of front-runners and helps consolidate their advantage. Although Iowa and New Hampshire can provide some sort of momentum to long-shot candidates, ultimately, candidates without sufficient resources to continue in bigger media markets and concentrate on larger constituencies end up dropping out of the race. "People don't quit running for President because they are tired of it or because it is hard. People quit running for President because they can't afford to keep the campaign going," noted Smith.¹¹

Perhaps the most insidious and important effects of front-loading are those on the public. In Election 2000, Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore had all but locked up the Republican and Democratic nominations for president by March 7, 2000; voters in 33 states had not yet cast their primary ballots. Because the front-loading of the primary schedule locks up the nomination increasingly early, many states and millions of voters are essentially left out of the decision-making process. The perception among many of these people is that their vote does not matter. "Today, too many people in too many states have no voice in the election of our major party nominees," said former Tennessee Senator William Brock in a Detroit News article. "For them," said Brock, who chaired an advisory board charged with recommending primary reform, "the nominations are over before they have begun."¹²

Some even argue that the decision is often made before any primary or caucus takes place. "A great many voters think it doesn't make any difference whether they vote or not. There's a good argument that they are correct about it because other people are making the decision," said Alexander at a Center event. "The people who are supposed to be making virtually all the decisions on who the presidential nominees are have almost nothing to do with it."¹³ Alexander held up a article from December 1999 with the pictures of four presidential candidates (Bill Bradley, Al Gore, John McCain, and George W. Bush) and said, "One could argue that the system works pretty well, that it has presented us with four individuals … It's pretty well worked out and we can all go back to our business and we do not need to worry about the presidential race." However, he quickly points out, "Nobody has voted yet. And it's already all decided. There's no vote until January by anybody."¹⁴

Alexander advanced his argument by citing survey work done by the Vanishing Voter Project at Harvard University's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, indicating that in December 1999, four out of five surveyed said they had not yet thought about the presidential race. "All of the decisions that have been made so far in producing four very good finalists have been made not by anyone voting and not even by polls of anyone who's thought about the race," observed Alexander.¹⁵

Among it findings, the Vanishing Voter Project concludes that reform proposals, when it comes to the nominating process, should be judged on the basis of their ability to foster:

1. A shorter campaign;
2. A nominating process that remains competitive for a longer period of time in order to give the public a greater opportunity to engage the campaign and to become informed about the candidates;
3. A briefer interval between the decisive contests and the conventions in order to help people sustain the levels of public engagement and information they had attained when the nominating campaign peaked; and
4. A system that increases the likelihood that voters in all states will have an effective voice in the selection of the nominees.¹⁶

As the sweeping nature of these rubrics indicates, it is very difficult to definitively establish the effects, especially long-term, of a proposed reform. It is usually true that drastic changes will lead to certain unintended and unexpected consequences. The Center for Governmental Studies believes that the goal of opening the process up to more participants warrants serious consideration of the various reform options despite any potential uncertainty. As Tom Sansonetti, former chairman of the RNC Rules Committee, put it while discussing reform: "Are there going to be some problems in implementing it? Of course. Nothing is easy in politics. But, if the goal is worthwhile, then it is worth pursuing."¹⁷

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

1. National Primary Day

Under this plan, all states would hold their primary or caucus on the same day-a pre-election Election Day. The idea was introduced as early as 1913 by Woodrow Wilson but has gained little momentum. For all intents and purposes, as front-loading increases as a trend, the nation seems to be naturally moving in the direction of what amounts to a national primary. "You had 20 states in February in '96. You had 35 states in February 2000. I predict you will have 39 states in February 2004," said Sansonetti. "So, it is shifting to what is basically a national primary. It is a de facto national primary right now."¹⁸

This plan would almost certainly increase salience and turnout in primaries and caucuses. More Americans would believe that they had a say in choosing the candidates for president. However, it would almost certainly minimize direct contact between candidates and voters. Campaigns would be waged on the national level, primarily through paid and free media, making it virtually impossible for candidates without personal fortune or establishment backing to compete. Depending upon the specifics of implementation (such as whether independents and swing-voters would be allowed to participate) a national primary day could keep party nominees more in line with mainstream views. Success in such a contest would provide strong evidence of electability. Party rank and file, and perhaps independent voters, would be able to exert their undiluted preferences on presidential nominees, an unsettling prospect for the party elites. Such a distribution of power could hamper the formation of core party platforms-often the hallmark of viable presidential candidates. Understandably, the parties are reluctant to discuss this sort of plan, partly because it would diffuse control over the selection of their nominee, undermining the exclusive and predictable hierarchy of conventions. An event of this magnitude would also render the conventions even more of a non-event than they are today. The last serious dialogue addressing a national presidential primary was silenced in 1970 by the Democrats' Commission of Party Structure and Delegate Selection.

2. The Delaware Plan

The Delaware Plan is the brainchild of Delaware GOP state chairman Basil Battaglia. Under the Delaware Plan, the states would be grouped into four "pods" according to population, as determined by the decennial census. The smallest thirteen states would go first, followed by the next smallest thirteen states, then the twelve medium-sized states and finally the twelve largest states.

Small states like Delaware and North Dakota hold primaries or caucuses in February or March, and the process continues until the largest states, including California, Texas, and New York, vote in May or June. States remain free to chose between a primary or a caucus and can schedule their event at any time during their appointed month. They are also free to drop back later in the nomination calendar, although they may not move forward.

The plan passed the Republican National Committee Rules Committee in early 2000 but failed at the July 2000 Republican Convention in Philadelphia. Sansonetti told the Symposium that he believes the plan has a chance to pass in time for the 2004 primaries, but success will take cooperation between the White House and the Republican Party.

The Delaware Plan boasts several advantages and addresses the problem of front-loading. Battaglia and other proponents defend the plan as the logical way to encourage voter participation and discourage front-loading, while giving small states an opportunity to play an important role in the process.

Letting the smallest states begin the contest, "allows a grassroots campaign to catch fire. The Jimmy Carter example in '76, the Gary Hart example from'84, the Eugene McCarthy example for that matter in 1968," said Sansonetti.¹⁹ This plan can help lesser known and under-funded candidates gain momentum from victories in the smaller "pods." This will also diminish, although not eliminate, the benefits of homesteading years in advance, since seven or eight states will head the pack instead of just one.

A CBSNews.com article notes that "Plan backers say it will preserve the 'retail' side of politics, keeping candidates down on the ground talking to people where they live and work, not just up on the airwaves through expensive television ads."²⁰ It could extend the direct attention of grassroots campaigning enjoyed by citizens of Iowa and New Hampshire to the other small states in the nation.

Having several small states in which to mount grassroots campaigns gives more candidates a chance to post a win in the first pod. However, having thirteen small, geographically separate states in the first grouping makes it very difficult to wage a sizeable effort in every state. This may force candidates to choose a few markets deemed more viable, leaving other states out in the cold.

The Delaware Plan aims to lengthen the process, giving voters a chance to observe and follow the candidates through a period of three or four months instead of a quick five or six weeks. Plan supporters argue that candidates will have a chance to prove their mettle because only 9 percent of all delegates (in the GOP plan) would be chosen in the first round. This means it is likely that the eventual winner would not be decided until the later rounds, maybe even in the final round, which determines 50.5 percent of convention delegates, according to Sansonetti.²¹

Opponents argue that money will still play too large a role in the selection of a nominee for president. Even the first rounds, with relatively small states spread across the nation, may prove expensive. Candidates will have to last longer in the race, from a five- or six-week scrimmage to a three- or four-month marathon; therefore, the key to staying in the race is money. However, an extended race could help lesser-funded candidates by giving them time to build on any momentum they can muster in the small states. Often candidates drop out despite voter interest and a good early showing in the polls because there was simply not enough time to fundraise and organize for later contests. The Delaware Plan may address this time-crunch problem.

Delaware Plan proponents argue that instead of just one winner, there could be multiple winners in the Plan's first contests. Because a win in New Hampshire or Iowa could propel a candidate's campaign into high gear, having several New Hampshires and Iowas could elevate more dark-horse candidates in the beginning of the nominating season.

New Hampshire and Iowa presently dominate the news circuit. With the addition of ten or twelve states, the media's attention will spread out, possibly to include candidates that would otherwise be invisible under the current system.

One of the main problems with the Delaware Plan is that it might create four mini-national campaigns. Each grouping of states is spread out across the country, making it very difficult to have a concentrated effort anywhere. This plan would likely increase the wear and tear on candidates or the media. Moreover, having more than one or two small states at the beginning of the schedule would force candidates to choose among the group for more viable markets and opt to disregard others. Thus, candidates would probably end up saturating the other states with television ads and direct mailings to compensate for the lack of personal appearances. It is already very expensive waging a media campaign in the two major media markets reaching New Hampshire-Manchester and Boston. Imagine doing so in all of the states in the first pod.

This plan may also favor East Coast states as a result of the news cycle. "If you have a choice between Washington state and a smaller state on the East Coast, and you can only play one of them, you are playing the one on the East Coast because you can make the news cycle as opposed to the West Coast," Craig Smith told the Symposium. "If they are the same day as East Coast states, East Coast states are getting the attention because the news cycle moves on the East Coast time as opposed to the West Coast time."²² Under the Delaware Plan, geographically disparate states could hold their primaries on the same day, such as Alaska and Delaware. Because Delaware will make the six o'clock news, it is most likely that Delaware will be considered more newsworthy.

3. Rotating Primary Plan

The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), comprising of chief election officials across the nation, believes the nominating system today is unworkable and is pushing to scrap the front-loaded primary calendar. In 2000, the NASS recommended the Rotating Presidential Primary Plan and suggested that it be in place before the 2004 primaries.²³ Under the proposal, the United States is divided into four regions-Northeast, Midwest, West, and South-having roughly the same number of votes in the Electoral College, based upon the 1990 census. The Northeast region (in red) has a total of 13 states and 127 electoral votes. The Midwest grouping (in yellow) has a total of 129 electoral votes in 12 states. The 13 western states (in blue) have 119 electoral votes. The South is the largest region (in green) with 163 electoral votes in 13 states.

Proposed Regional Nomination Map

Primaries to select national convention delegates would be grouped by region: Eastern states will hold their primaries in March, the South in April, the Midwest in May, and the West in June. Primaries in each state would be scheduled on or about the first Tuesday in March, April, May, or June, and not all states in a given region would hold their primaries on the same date. The regions would then rotate starting in 2008. The South moves up to first, followed by the Midwest, West, and East. But there is a critical caveat under this plan: Iowa and New Hampshire retain their leading positions in the presidential sweepstakes.

"Front-loading the presidential primary process is forcing candidates to begin campaigning earlier than ever," said Secretary of State Joyce Hazeltine, former president of NASS and South Dakota Secretary of State. "By implementing the rotating regional primary plan, we can more clearly define the presidential campaign season and provide voters and candidates with the opportunity to focus more intently on candidates as they discuss issues relevant to each region."²⁴

The Rotating Presidential Primary Plan shares some of the advantages of the Delaware Plan. Like the Delaware Plan, this regional plan also aims to extend the race and eliminate frontloading, therefore allowing voters the chance to observe candidates in a longer period of time and giving dark-horse candidates some opportunity to build upon momentum.

This plan also addresses some of the weaknesses in the Delaware Plan. Candidates can conduct regional campaigns, which allows them to concentrate on regional issues and possibly save money by focusing their media buys. This ability to camp out would likely reduce wear and tear on the candidates, the staff, and the media, and promote meaningful interaction between candidates and voters. Candidates will be exposed more than ever before to the concerns and complaints of regional voters. They will hear about the no-tax pledge in New Hampshire and ethanol policy in Iowa, but also about union concerns in the Great Lakes or cotton prices in the South. "They might actually get to know something about the states instead of just the airports in the states," Sabato said of regional plans.²⁵

One issue not addressed by the Rotating Presidential Primary Plan is the propensity of candidates to homestead. For starters, this plan fails to break up the Iowa-New Hampshire monopoly. As a result, these two states will continue to set the tone for the entire race, and the candidates will continue to camp out in these states, preserving the permanent campaign. Homesteading may actually become more prevalent under such a plan. Because campaigns will know decades in advance which region will go first in any given election year, they may choose to spend even more time pandering to voters in an entire region. This predictability will likely dictate the timing of presidential bids by certain candidates, as they await a year in which the regional order benefits them. It may actually extend homesteading over several election cycles, rather than just years.

4. Regional Lottery System During the Symposium, Center director Larry Sabato proposed the Regional Lottery System. This plan divides the United States into four regions (identical to those in the Rotating Presidential Primary Plan). States in each region hold their nominating events in successive months, beginning in March and running through June. It is similar to the plan proposed by the NASS, but there are two key differences: the order of regions holding nominating events is determined by a lottery, and there are no lead-off states.

An American Election Lottery determines the order in which the four regions will participate in the process. Run by a five-member nonpartisan part-time election lottery commission appointed by an organization such as the National Association of Secretaries of State, the new lottery could become the Powerball of politics. On a predetermined date approximately six months prior to the first contest (so as to allow the regions ample time to prepare for an election) a lottery with four colored balls representing the four regions on the color-coded primary map will be drawn, with the first region drawn going first and so on down the line.

Because it is a state-based system, each state will have the right to choose between a primary election and a caucus. To encourage the caucus system, which is cheaper to organize and assists in party-building, Sabato proposes that caucus states be first out of the gate-on the first of the month, followed by primaries on the fifteenth.

The Regional Lottery System also enjoys many of the same advantages as the Rotating Presidential Primary Plan, but the key to this plan is the lottery used to determine the order each region will participate in the nominating process. Because candidates are unable to know more than a few months in advance which region will lead off the calendar, homesteading is eliminated and candidates are forced to focus equally on all areas.

The lottery plan also contributes to the development of a primary campaign that retains its competitiveness while pushing the campaign itself closer to the national convention to sustain voter interest throughout the process. The lottery could also insert a degree of excitement into the nominating process. Over the long term, it gives more states, based upon the law of averages, the opportunity to be one of the first contests and have a substantial impact in candidate selection.

The nomination calendar kicks off in March and continues until June under this plan, giving the voters and candidates breathing room and reversing the trend toward front-loaded contests. "The American people might like it. It might reduce costs. It certainly would reduce wear and tear. It makes more sense to most people. It encourages focus on regional issues. And it certainly shortens the permanent campaign," argued Sabato.²⁶

While Sabato's plan does address some flaws of the NASS plan, it does not deal with the fact that regional events may approach the scope of a national campaign and force an over-reliance on the media to communicate with the public. The four regions are still very large areas, which would likely favor candidates with a large amount of money or outstanding name recognition at the very beginning of the campaign. Also, because candidates will not know until very late which region will go first, they may be forced to begin national campaigns years in advance.

REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS

The Center advocates Sabato's Regional Lottery System, but with a few significant twists.

First, the Center does not believe that the comparative advantages of caucuses or primaries warrant creating a scheduling incentive favoring one over the other. The parties and states should determine their own priorities in this regard.

Secondly, the Center wishes to enhance Sabato's original proposal with an addition suggested by Craig Smith during the Symposium. Smith recommended creating a second lottery to pick two small states to begin the contest, as Iowa and New Hampshire do now. Under this composite plan, the months prior to the nominating contests would feature an initial lottery to determine assigned months for the regional primaries and a second lottery to pick from among the smallest states, for two lead-off contests to be held in February. The choice between holding a primary and a caucus will be left to the two states picked in the lottery. This lottery would include all states and the District of Columbia with electoral votes no greater than a predetermined number-for example, seven-but it would not include island territories.²⁷ While we are not particularly wedded to this number, it does make nearly half of the states eligible in 2004 and 2008 and allows both Iowa (7) and New Hampshire (4) the possibility of being selected. The Center believes this proposal provides an alternative to front-loading and injects greater excitement and variety into the nominating process by way of a lottery. It also incorporates most of the goals for reform without creating a new set of problems or simply transferring the problems of the current system to a new location. Most importantly, the Center believes that this sort of system will increase the total number of citizens participating meaningfully in the nominating process.

The Challenge of Change

As a general point, the Center calls upon the parties and the states to work together in seeking solutions to the diminishing involvement of voters in the nominating process. The Center believes parties and states should bear much of the responsibility in utilizing the nominating process to encourage and promote voter participation in the political process. It is our hope that the discussions of the Symposium and this report serve to encourage this sort of leadership.

Given the difference of opinion between large and small states, plus the unpredictability of population shifts, dividing the map into regions suitable for all states will be a daunting task. Moreover, trying to effect change in all fifty states will be challenging. This requires coordinating party policy with state laws, both of which tend to become mired in political jockeying.

States will have mixed reactions to any reform proposals. Large and small states have conflicting interests that will most likely cause gridlock in any reform action. Iowa and New Hampshire will not welcome reform with open arms if their status would be diminished in any way. "Each state needs to work together to place our national interest ahead of individual state interests so we can resolve the crisis that has evolved in the presidential nomination process," said Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth Bill Galvin, chair of the NASS Committee on Presidential Primaries.²⁸

The Republican and Democratic parties are also hesitant to enact drastic change. Any reform effort will require cooperation between the parties. One party is unlikely to move without the other, for fear of creating a strategic disadvantage for its candidate. Furthermore, the parties have to balance competing objectives: the interests of the party and the interest of the general public. Parties only wield influence and power when their candidates are elected. They do not get anything for a good effort. Therefore it is not necessarily in the interest of the party to extend the nominating process. However, the burden of increasing accessibility to the process and encouraging voter participation has more and more fallen on the shoulders of the parties. Energizing voters through party-sponsored activities and mobilizing voters to the polls are inevitably in the interest of the parties. This would allow parties to create stronger bases and wider support. Yet, it is questionable whether parties will bare the opportunity costs of extending the nominating process. This directly translates into giving up some control of the party's nominee. But for the good of the republic, parties should take a step back and re-examine their role in promoting the health of our democracy.

_______________

Notes

1. Ben White, "After Drama Left the Primaries, Voter Turnout Fell Dramatically," The Washington Post, September 1, 2000, p. A5.

2. Bob Smith, "Fairness in Primaries," memorandum to the Republican National Committee members and delegates. June 2000. http://gwis2.circ.gwu.edu.

3. Jill Lawrence, remarks to the University of Virginia National Symposium Series. March 7, 2001.

4. Lamar Alexander, remarks to the University of Virginia American Democracy Conference. December 6, 1999.

5. Michael Dukakis, remarks to the University of Virginia National Symposium Series. April 5, 2001.

6. Craig Smith, remarks to the University of Virginia National Symposium Series. March 7, 2001.

7. Data on New Hampshire and Iowa provided by U.S. Census Bureau. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.

8. Terry M. Neal, "Primaries Could Be Decisive by Mid-March," The Washington Post, July 2, 1999, p. A1.

9. Kathleen Kendall, "Communication Patterns in Presidential Primaries 1912-2000: Knowing the Rules of the Game," research paper for the Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics, and Public Policy. June 1998, pp. 11-12.

10. Vaughn Ververs, remarks to the University of Virginia National Symposium Series. March 7, 2001.

11. Craig Smith.

12. Richard A. Ryan, "Early Primaries are Leaving Big States in Also-Ran Position," detnews.com, May 10, 2000. http://detnews.com/2000/politics/0005/10/a13-53312.htm.

13. Alexander.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Thomas E. Patterson, "Public Involvement and the 2000 Nominating Campaign: Implications for Electoral Reform," The Vanishing Voter Project, April 27, 2000. http://www.vanishingvoter.org/releases/04-27-00prim-4.shtml.

17. Tom Sansonetti, remarks to the University of Virginia. National Symposium Series. March 7, 2001.

18. Sansonetti.

19. Sansonetti.

20. Susan Walsh, "Primary Reform Clears GOP Hurdle," CBSNews.com. July 26, 2000. http://www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,219401-412,00.shtml.

21. Sansonetti.

22. Craig Smith.

23. For more information, see http://www.nass.org/issues.html#primaryplan.

24. South Dakota Secretary of State Press Release. "State Election Officials Call on Governors, State Legislators, and Political Parties to Work Together on Proposal on Inject order into Primary Process," July 28, 1999. http://www.state.sd.us/sos/releases/regional_presidential_primaries_.htm.

25. Larry J. Sabato, remarks to the University of Virginia. National Symposium Series. March 7, 2001.

26. Sabato.

27. States with seven or less electoral votes: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

28. South Dakota Secretary of State Press Release. July 28, 1999.

(c) 2001, University of Virginia Center for Governmental Studies.