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ADDENDUM:

JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA

EN EL EXILIO

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ QUESADA

Carlos Rodriguez Quesada was general coordinator of the Cuban underground movement known as the 30th of November, named for an anti-Batista uprising on November 30, 1956 led by Frank Pais who was killed in the assault. The organization was made up mainly of labor union members.

Quesada was also a leader of the labor movement among sugar and agricultural workers in the Province of Las Villas and rose to national prominence in the 4 Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC). Although Quesada had fought Batista with Castro and was elected to Secretary General of the CTC after Castro took power, he grew disgruntled with Castro's Communist leanings.

Likewise, the 30th of November which philosophically leaned toward socialism and nationalization of industry, was totally opposed to Castro and Communism. The group began across-the-board anti-Castro activities including guerilla actions, sabotage, propaganda and exfiltrations of members from Cuba. The 30th of November was considered to be one of the most effective organizations in the Cuban underground until infiltration by Castro agents and Cuban government repression following the Bay of Pigs invasion severely crippled its activities.

Quesada and other 30th of November members were forced to seek asylum. Quesada escaped to the United States in March 1961 aboard a fishing boat.

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During his last days in the Cuban underground,

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Quesada had been in contact with L.S. agents in Havana.

However, after he took asylum, he began to disagree with them about how to utilize the underground members within 12
labor and peasant organizations. Nevertheless the 30th of November did join the CIA-sponsored Cuban Revolutionary 13
Council, and received \$6000 per month from it.

But Quesada had his troubles with the Council as well. One incident occurred when Quesada went to Puerto 14 Rico on a special operation for the Council. It was learned that Quesada had been independently courting sympathetic military leaders and senators who disagreed with what 15 was then State Department policy toward Cuba. At the same time, Quesada was involved in discussions among the leaders of the DRE, MRP and the 30th of November about forming a new unity group outside the Council organizational 150 umbrella.

These activities put Quesada at odds with the Council
leadership and in March 1962 he was expelled by Antonio
Varona, the Council's general coordinator, for "lack of 16
discipline." The actual reason given for Quesada's expulsion
was his involvemnet in organizing a hunger strike in Bayfront 17
Park in Aiami at which 152 people were arrested. The
strike had been planned as a peaceful demonstration during 18
President Kennedy's Aarch 10th visit to Aiami. The strikers
called for aid for the liberation of Cuba and the
19
resignation of Jose Airo Cardona as head of the Council.

Other well-known Cuban exile leaders such as Laureano

Batista Falla of the MDC had joined Quesada in the pro20
test. The so-called peaceful demonstration, however,
deteriorated into a wild melee and the arrests ensued.

A few weeks later, Quesada held a press conference 21
criticizing the Council. These actions caused a division 22
among the members of the 30th of November. Part of the group elected to remain with the Council while Quesada set up a rival faction named the Movimento Revolucionario 23
de Frank Pais. Because the 30th of November had been so closely identified with Quesada and his followers,
Quesada's group continued to be referred to as the 30th of November. Having lost the healthy Council subsidy, however, Quesada spent the next few months trying to gain 25 recognition for his group and find ways to fund it.

The group soon became known as one of the more outspoken of the anti-Castro organizations. In April of 1962 an FBI report noted that the group's leaders 26 no longer trusted the CIA. Quesada revealed that in a February 1962 operation planned with the CIA, the 30th of November group had given names of the participants in Cuba to the CIA but those individuals had been 27 subsequently arrested.

By 1963, Quesada's attitude toward the U.S. government showed no signs of softening. In March, he wrote a letter to Presidnet Kennedy requesting immediate armed intervention 28 in Cuba to fight Communism. "You are either with or

29

against America," Quesada claimed.

Shortly after, Quesada and his followers joined

30
Paulino Sierra's Junta del Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio.

31
Quesada became the Junta's head of Internal Affairs.

However, several agency reports reviewed by the

Committee raise questions about Quesada's motivation
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in joining the Junta. A CIA report indicated Quesada
33
wanted respectability to cover illicit dealings. The
report also suggested Quesada was living suspiciously
high for someone receiving assistance from the
34
Cuban Refugee Center. Other reports were more critical.
One called Quesada unreliable and untrustworhty, describing
him as a man who surrounds himself with "thieves, homo35
sexuals and drug addicts."

In early 1964, after the Junta had ceased activities, 36
Quesada was expelled from his own group, the MRFP. There
were reports that Quesada had been misappropriating 37
funds for his own use.

In assessing Quesada's role in the Junta del Gobierno de Cuba and the effectiveness of the Junta itself, Quesada's personal relationship with the anti-Castro organizations may be be significant. Several agency reports reviewed by the Committee suggest that "opportunists" made up much of the 38 membership of the Junta and contributed to its final demise.

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QUESADA, page 5

Quesada may well fit into that category of individuals who sought funds from the Junta but made no effort to recruit followers or help unify all the anti-Castro groups into the Junta. In fact, Quesada may have been less a true leader of a group than one who used his role in the organization for his own ends.

- 1. HSCA Staff Summary of the Cuban Revolutionary Handbook, Section, RE: MRTN, (Hereinafter Handbook Summary) Also, see Staff Summary of CIA file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, p. 1 (Ref. Confidential Memo, May 19, 1962) (Hereinafter CIA-Quesada)
- 2. Handbook Summary, Section RE: MRTN
- 3. CIA-Quesada, p. 1 (Ref. Confidential Memo, May 19, 1962)
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Ibid., p. 3, (Ref. January 18, 1961, Memo to Turner from Murphy)
- 6. Handbook Summary, Section on MRTN
- 7. Ibid.
- 8. Ibid.
 Also, see
 HSCA Staff Summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez
 Quesada, p. 5, (Ref. #105-107224-16, March 15, 1962, Miami)
 (Hereinafter FBI-Quesada)
- 9. CIA-Quesada, p. 3 (Ref. January 18, 1961, Memo to Turner from Murphy)
- 10. Ibid., p. 1 (Ref. Biographic Data, June 20, 1961)
- 11. Ibid., p. 1 (Ref. Confidential Memo, May 19, 1962)
- 12. Ibid.

- 15. Ibid.
- 15a. Ibid., p. 6 (Ref. #109-584-3414, February 14, 1963, and #97-4133-60, April 30, 1963)
- 16. Ibid., p. 7 (Ref. #105-107224-16, March 15, 1962, Miami)
 Also, see
 Handbook Summary, MRTN Section
- 17. Ibid., p. 4 (Ref. #105-107224-A. March 19, 1962) and p. 8 (Ref. #105-92196-24, March 15, 1962)

- 18. Ibid., p. 1 (Ref. #109-584-3102, Miami March 15, 1962)
- 19. Ibid.
- 20. Ibid.
- 21. Ibid., p. 4 (Ref. #109-584-3183, May 28, 1963, Miami)
- 22. Handbook Summary, MRTN Section
- 23. Ibid.
- **些**、VOID
- 25. Ibid.
- 26. FBI-Quesada, p. 8 (Ref. #105-92196-30, April 16, 1962)
- 27. Ibid.
- 28. Ibid., p. 7 (Ref. 105-92196-70, April 12, 1963)
- 29. Ibid.
- 30. Handbook Summary, MRTN Section
- 31. Ibid.
- 32. VOID
- 33. CIA-Quesada, p. 1 (Ref. #00 A 3,277,525, Mimi 10015)
- 34. Ibid.
- 35. Handbook Summary, MRTN Section
- 36. Ibid.
- 37. FBI-Quesada, p. 4 (Ref, #105-137256-4, April 21, 1964)
- 38. HSCA Staff Summary of FBI file for Paulino Sierra Martinez, p. 7, Memo, February 28, 1961, RE: JGCE)